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20-74 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA


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
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda



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EUROPE

HONECKER IGNORES GUILLAUME AFFAIR, STRESSES GDR-USSR TIES

In his first public speech since Willy Brandt's resignation, GDR leader Honecker refrained from commenting directly on the Guillaume spy affair and called for the continuation of GDR-FRG relations as if nothing had intervened to upset them. Speaking on 12 April at a congress of the German-Soviet Friendship Society in Dresden, Honecker declared that the GDR was ready "to develop normal relations of peaceful coexistence with the FRG" and claimed credit for the initiatives which had made possible such agreements as that on establishment of permanent missions in the two countries' respective capitals. He appealed to "all responsible politicians" who are guided by "realism" to work for the further normalization of relations between the GDR and FRG.

Honecker's tone of reasonableness is the more notable in that his speech came just one day after Brandt had publicly challenged him in a speech in West Berlin. Brandt was quoted by the Western press as saying: "Honecker may be in a position to contribute to the Chancellor's resignation, but no one should allow him to undermine the policy of detente in the center of Europe." Honecker's forbearance from responding to such a direct personal challenge underscores the apparent determination of the East German leaders to avoid inflaming the situation at the present time.

In his speech Honecker laid great stress on the intimacy of GDR-USSR relations. While this emphasis seemed called for by the occasion, it may also have been intended to serve notice that the authority of the regime and its international standing would not be shaken by the spy scandal. TASS, in its summary of the speech, included the passage in which Honecker claimed that the two countries coordinated and harmonized their positions on the "strategic and tactical questions of foreign and defense policy."

MOSCOW Moscow has suggested by selective reportage and limited comment that continuity will be the keyword in the new Bonn leadership's policy toward Eastern Europe and the USSR. Thus, in two Bonn-dated dispatches in PRAVDA on the 10th and 12th by correspondent Ye. Grigoryev and in IZVESTIYA on the 12th by S. Tosunyan, as well as in a few radio commentaries on the resignation, Moscow has noted the elements of the developing Bonn domestic situation which reinforce this theme of continuity. It has cited,

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for example, the continuation of the SPD-FDP coalition with its "stable" majority, Brandt's strong personal endorsement of Schmidt as the next chancellor, Brandt's continuation as SPD chairman, and "evidence" in Schmidt's background of his support for Brandt and Ostpolitik. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, Grigoryev cited on the 12th a leading FDP spokesman as saying "there was no alternative" to the Brandt-Scheel policy toward the East.

Self-initiated comment by Moscow has been extremely limited, but PRAVDA commentator T. Kolesnichenko, in a radio broadcast on the 13th, declared that it was "encouraging" that Bonn has given "reassurances that the country's present policy will continue." Moscow's purported "public" radio station, Radio Peace and Progress (RPP), in a commentary to Germany on the 13th ridiculed allegations in the West that there was "uneasiness in the capitals of the socialist states" over the events in West Germany. After citing many of the above points as indicators that Bonn would continue its policy toward the East, including exceptional praise for Schmidt as "an energetic SPD politician" who has "more than once" demonstrated his support for the FRG's "constructive foreign policy," RPP concluded: "It goes without saying that our side has supported and will continue to support all constructive steps by the Federal Republic's government which are aimed at developing . . . mutually advantageous links and mutual understanding with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states."

Moscow has refrained from mentioning the Guillaume case since Brandt's resignation, attributing his departure as due, among other things, to difficulties within the SPD, "harassment by the reactionary forces," and the internal economic situation.

EAST EUROPEAN
CRITICISM OF GDR

The first high-level East European public reaction to Brandt's resignation came in a speech by Polish leader Gierek on the 8th. Gierek raised to an official level the glowing praise for Brandt that had appeared in Warsaw commentaries following the resignation. Speaking at a congress of World War II veterans, Gierek, in a highly emotional speech on the sufferings of the Polish people under Hitler, included a passage applauding the leadership of Brandt and Scheel. He said that Brandt's resignation "surprised" the world and those from whom "he had gained great respect," adding that Poland "thinks" the FRG will continue its "positive trend." Gierek's praise for Brandt as one who personally fought against Hitler could be interpreted as an indirect slap at the East Germans for going too far in their intelligence activities.

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Along the same line, an article in the Bucharest SCINTEIA on the 9th declared that "the Romanian people consider regrettable the circumstances that led to the resignation. . . ." Budapest radio carried an interview with a West German reporter on the 12th which included the reporter's comment that he could see no future difficulties in Bonn's relations with East Europe except "only as regards the GDR." Much of the routine East European comment continues to play down the idea that the Guillaume case was the real reason for Brandt's resignation, stressing that internal economic and political difficulties were the true causes.

MOSCOW SEES ITALIAN IMPORT CURB AS MARKING NEW EC CRISIS

In comment on EC affairs following Rome's announcement two weeks ago that Italy would impose restrictions on industrial and agricultural imports, Moscow has professed to see evidence of a new crisis in EC affairs testifying once more to the inability of the European states to reconcile their national differences. In a weekly review of world events over Moscow radio on 13 May, PRAVDA foreign news editor T. Kolesnichenko called the Italian move "unprecedented." He noted that Denmark had announced it also intends to restrict certain imports, albeit through raising tariffs, and he emphasized that a further "chain reaction" by other EC members may occur as individual states attempt to solve their own economic problems.

While noting the disintegrative implications of these developments, Soviet media have stopped short of the pessimistic predictions offered in some West European newspapers that the EC, in beginning to regress to short-sighted policies of national protectionism, is disintegrating and facing the danger of a complete break-up. A Moscow radio commentary by A. Zholkver on 6 May, for instance, placed Italy's import measures in a long list of various EC crises. Remark- ing that all the EC countries face serious economic difficulties, Zholkver concluded mildly that the present situation reflects well-known differences in the economic interests of capitalist states and is a sign of the "general crisis of capitalism." Another Moscow radio commentary, by N. Kononov on 8 May, followed a similar line and characterized Italy's actions as current evidence of the "permanent crisis in the EC," which Kononov defined as the incompatibility between the EC members' national interests and the interests of the EC as an organization. Professing to find the underlying cause of this opposition in an EC desire to satisfy international and national monopoly interests, rather than to serve the public welfare, Kononov predicted that the EC would continue to experience such crises.

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Moscow showed similar restraint in treating the EC ministers meeting in Brussels on 7-9 May which discussed the Italian import measures. The day after the meeting Moscow radio rebroadcast virtually verbatim the Zholkver commentary of 6 May, which had only noted without evaluation that the meeting was taking place. A report in PRAVDA on 10 May by Yu. Yasnev, briefly reviewing the meeting, said simply that the EC ministers had criticized Italy's actions and that the meeting ended in an "atmosphere of disagreement and pessimism."

While continuing to depict the EC as being in a state of disunity and "permanent crisis," Moscow has at the same time restated its long-standing position that "closed economic groupings" such as the EC should be replaced by expanded economic relations "on an all-European level, including the socialist countries." To reinforce the point, some comment has asserted that the 15-year experience of the socialist economic community, CEMA, has shown that all Europe could have a viable economic community, provided it is based on "full equality and mutual advantage."

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V-E DAY ANNIVERSARY

DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO FAILS TO AUTHOR TRADITIONAL ARTICLE

The most noteworthy feature of Moscow's 9 May commemoration of V-E Day this year was Defense Minister Grechko's failure to contribute his usual PRAVDA article. This was the first time since 1967 that Grechko has failed to author a PRAVDA article on this occasion with the exception of 1970, when he delivered a speech in Moscow on the 25th V-E Day anniversary. Other military leaders, in commemorative articles appearing in the central press, for the most part retreated from last year's more optimistic assessments of world affairs and instead offered more guarded assessments that echoed themes in Brezhnev's address to the World Peace Congress in Moscow last October and the communique of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in Warsaw last month. Of the military spokesmen, Admiral Gorshkov projected the most truculent image of the "imperialist" military threat. The only figure to break ranks from the otherwise solid military lineup was a military historian who in a PRAVDA article singled out the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations in recent years and called detente the "dominant" world trend--the latter theme having been drawn from the Warsaw Pact communique.

Navy chief Sergey Gorshkov, writing in the 9 May TRUD, was the most outspoken of all the military spokesmen in his marshalling of evidence for a continuing external threat. He placed Brezhnev's World Peace Congress phraseology about "continuing and even intensifying" preparations for world war into an even more ominous context, warning that "imperialism," having "regrouped its forces" since the last war, "has now launched preparations for a new world war under the guidance of the monopolies across the ocean and of the excessively militant circles who express their interests." That Gorshkov was warning specifically of the U.S. danger was apparent elsewhere as well--in his complaint about the "continuing arms race in the United States" and his reference to "nuclear blackmail" as an indication that Moscow must continue to look to its own defenses. Gorshkov was also the only military spokesman to evoke the spectre of Peking as a further cause for maintaining vigilance.

Chief of the General Staff Viktor Kulikov, in RED STAR's contribution to the occasion, was the only military figure to list the recent debate in the United States over missile targeting strategy among the adverse developments in world affairs. Following a line of

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argument established in earlier Moscow commentary on Defense Secretary Schlesinger's statements about targeting, Kulikov complained that the Pentagon was searching for "acceptable" means of waging a nuclear missile war.

Strategic Missile Forces chief Vladimir Tolubko, speaking on Moscow radio on the 8th, Main Political Directorate head Yepishev, writing in IZVESTIYA on the 9th, and other military figures generally made the same points, though in a less striking manner than Gorshkov. All paid at least minimal homage to the fruits of Soviet detente policy, but only First Deputy Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov, writing in SOVIET RUSSIA on the 9th, failed to accompany that observation with a reminder that developments in the West nevertheless require continued attention to Soviet defenses.

A PRAVDA article by S. Tyushkevich, a member of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense, while conveying some of the same concerns about international affairs as the others, was the only one to single out the "favorable turn" in U.S.-Soviet relations resulting from the 1972 and 1973 summits and to cite that portion of the Warsaw Pact meeting's communique which noted that the trend toward detente is now the "dominant" feature of international relations. Most military spokesmen, in pointing to the continuing threat, also singled out that portion of the Warsaw Pact communique, carried by TASS on 19 April, which had seemed to play down the significance of recent East-West arms limitation initiatives. This passage had concluded that "as long as effective disarmament measures have not been implemented, the Warsaw Treaty countries deem it necessary to strengthen their defenses and develop close cooperation among themselves in this matter."

Grechko's traditional Order of the Day for the occasion sustained last year's more optimistic assessment of the international situation and was noteworthy primarily in adding praise for Brezhnev's personal role in foreign policy. Gorshkov also emphasized Brezhnev's "tireless activity" in this regard.

BACKGROUND V-E Day commentators drawing upon the formula in Brezhnev's 26 October World Peace Congress speech-- that "the process representing the most material preparation for world war is continuing and even intensifying" despite the "main" trend toward detente--were following the lead of other military figures who have made effective use of his remark since then. In the Soviet political leadership, only Grechko, Suslov and Ponomarev have reiterated this theme.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR WARNS OF "HALF MEASURES," SUPPORTS SYRIAN SUMMIT CALL

Remarks by Kosygin, as well as a low volume of routine comment, continue to press the Soviet view that troop disengagement is only a first step toward an overall Mideast settlement and that partial measures by themselves would be unacceptable. Reiterating this position in a 14 May speech at a dinner honoring Libyan Prime Minister Jallud, Kosygin declared that "we put emphasis on this matter because it became apparent lately that the aggressor and its patrons want to substitute some half measures, which only create a semblance of detente" in the Middle East, for an overall settlement.

Secretary Kissinger's talks in Israel and Syria on disengagement have been noted only briefly, primarily in Arabic-language broadcasts. While one such item on the 11th reported that statements by Israelis and members of Kissinger's party were cautiously optimistic about an agreement, other reports have taken pains to point out that Israel's "expansionist policy" constitutes an obstacle to an accord. Soviet commentators charge Israel with insisting on the "unacceptable condition" that Israeli occupation of Syrian territory should continue. RED STAR said on the 12th that Israel's military operations on the Golan Heights, over and above their tactical significance, were aimed at frustrating a political settlement or at least forcing Syria to renounce its most important demands and make concessions. Moscow commentators maintain that Syria has every right to take "effective steps" to liberate its territory, insure its own security and insist on an honorable disengagement agreement.

Hinting that a greater show of Arab support for Syria might be useful at the present juncture, Moscow has encouraged a Syrian request for an Arab summit conference.* IZVESTIYA on the 12th and 14th carried dispatches from its Beirut correspondent on the need for such a meeting, stressing the "great importance" of

* Damascus radio reported on 8 May that Syria was holding discussions with the Arab League on its request for an Arab summit conference to be held "soon." The Arab League Council, meeting in Tunis 25-28 March, had decided to hold the seventh Arab summit in Morocco in September, but it indicated that the date could be advanced if Damascus considered that the situation on the Syrian front required it.

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Damascus' initiative. Without mentioning a possible summit, TASS commentator Kulik noted on the 14th that Syria had repeatedly urged the Arab countries to mobilize their resources and strengthen their solidarity so that Israel could not take advantage of Arab disunity. And a Kolesnichenko weekly review broadcast to North America on the 13th remarked that Israel might believe Syria was weak and "isolated from other Arab countries" and its friends elsewhere.

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VIETNAM

PRG SUSPENDS BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH GVN, JMC SESSIONS

The PRG has announced that because of Saigon's "negative attitude" it has suspended participation in the two-party Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks in Saigon and in the consultative conference between the two South Vietnamese parties in France. While the PRG has previously boycotted individual JMC sessions to protest Saigon's alleged lack of cooperation, this constitutes the first indefinite postponement of the meetings. The talks at La Celle-Saint-Cloud had already been unilaterally adjourned by Saigon after the 47th session on 12 April, as a result of a GVN announcement on the 16th that it was suspending the talks sine die in retaliation for the loss of its base at Tonle Cham.*

A 10 May statement by the PRG military delegation to the JMC declared that it was "forced" to suspend participation at the delegation-head level and in the subcommission sessions and detailed a long list of alleged grievances--most of which the PRG has frequently aired in the past--with regard to Saigon's "scheme of intensifying the war and sabotaging" the Paris agreement. Concentrating on the charges directly pertaining to JMC operations, the statement declared that the PRG would resume its attendance when Saigon agreed to "resume and insure the exercise of all privileges and immunities" of the PRG's JMC delegation and "adopt a serious attitude in negotiations." According to the statement, Saigon has "paralyzed" the JMC through cancellation of the Saigon-Loc Ninh liaison flights, prevention of news conferences by the PRG military delegation, disruption of its telephone service, and obstruction of all contact with outsiders, including the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

The justification provided by the PRG Paris delegation in its 13 May statement for its formal suspension of the talks at La Celle-Saint-Cloud repeated the same charges made in the PRG military delegation's statement but gave no detailed explanation for taking the identical action for which the PRG has been criticizing the GVN. In setting forth the terms under which it would resume the talks, the statement only dealt in broad

* For communist reaction to Saigon's retaliatory measures, see the TRENDS of 24 April 1974, pages 20-21.

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generalizations--requiring that Saigon stop "undermining the negotiations" and adopt a "serious attitude." The Paris delegation statement also lashed out at U.S. "high officials" who have reaffirmed their "intention to carry on . . . a neocolonialist policy in South Vietnam" and berated the Nixon Administration for providing "increasing aid . . . , weapons, and other war materials and military advisers" to the Saigon administration.

As a followup to the suspension of the two-party negotiations, the PRG on the 15th issued a foreign ministry statement--broadcast by Liberation Radio the same day--reiterating its previous complaints against Saigon but injecting new charges of U.S. complicity. The statement accused the United States of being the "mastermind that has directed the Nguyen Van Thieu administration in sabotaging the Paris agreement" and characterized these actions as the "direct and basic cause underlying the present extremely hazardous situation in South Vietnam." It warned the United States and Saigon not to continue their "adventurous military acts" or sabotage negotiations and "create the danger of total collapse" of the consultative conference and the JMC.

DRV NOTES MILITARY PROMOTIONS, TRUONG CHINH DELEGATION TOUR

Recently Hanoi media have begun to reveal military promotions alluded to by DRV President Ton Duc Thang who announced at a "recent" military cadres conference--reported by Hanoi radio on 27 April--that the state was "promoting and bestowing the general-level military rank on a number of comrades."* Most notably, Hanoi's 12 May report on the funeral of Bui Lam, former deputy chief of the People's Supreme Procuratorate, identified Vice Minister of Defense Nguyen Don as a lieutenant general, rather than in his previous rank as major general. His promotion is not surprising, since he also holds important posts as army deputy chief of staff and member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Party Committee; he also delivered a report to the fourth session of the National Assembly in February as a representative of the Ministry of National Defense--a role traditionally filled by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Two promotions to major general have also been revealed by Hanoi in recent days. A 9 May VNA report on the attendance of DRV officials at a national day reception at the Czechoslovak embassy

* The military cadres conference and earlier promotions are discussed in the TRENDS of 1 May 1974, pages 2-3.

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for the first time identified Deputy Chief of Staff Phung The Tai as a major general. Tai had been the only deputy chief of staff who was only a senior colonel. A 14 May radio report on the composition of a National Assembly delegation going to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, led by Truong Chinh, revealed that it included a previously unidentified major general. Judging by the radio account--the only available report on the delegation--the new major general would appear to be former Senior Colonel Nguyen Quyet, an officer with responsibilities in the Third Military Region. The radio report noted that he was a military region political commissar.

TRUONG CHINH
DELEGATION

The National Assembly delegation led by Truong Chinh was seen off from Hanoi on 14 May by Politburo members Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Hoang Van Hoan, Tran Quoc Hoan, and Van Tien Dung. The substantial leadership turnout for the departure underlined the absence from the group of both First Secretary Le Duan and Defense Minister Giap, but their presence would not be mandatory for the departure of this type of delegation. Neither Le Duan nor Giap was among leaders present at the departure of the last known previous such delegation abroad--one led by Hoang Van Hoan in August 1971. (No public activities by Giap have been reported since Hanoi radio on 7 May broadcast an undated television talk he had given to mark the 20th anniversary of Dien Bien Phu.) Truong Chinh's last trip abroad was in December 1972, when he headed a party-government delegation to celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.

Truong Chinh's forthcoming visit to Czechoslovakia will fulfill a DRV promise, at the time of a Czechoslovak National Assembly delegation's visit in April 1973, to pay a return visit to Prague. A Supreme Soviet delegation visited Hanoi last December and, although no public invitation was extended at that time, it is possible Hanoi may yet announce an extension of the Truong Chinh tour to include Moscow. The Hoang Van Hoan delegation in August-September 1971 visited the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.

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CHINA

PEKING FETES BHUTTO, ENDORSES RECONCILIATION ON SUBCONTINENT

Peking leadership remarks during the 11-14 May visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto reflected Chinese approval of the April Indo-Pakistan agreement to implement the remaining 1971 UN resolutions on the Indo-Pakistani war as well as China's readiness to improve its own relations with India and Bangladesh while still supporting Pakistan. Peking accorded Bhutto the same full honors shown during his last visit in early 1972, including a meeting with Mao on 11 May and talks with Chou En-lai. A joint communique issued on 14 May testified to both sides' "full satisfaction" with Bhutto's visit, just as in 1972.

Chou En-lai's recently reduced public appearance posture was demonstrated by his absence from airport ceremonies, banquets, and some conversations with Bhutto, although Chou did attend meetings with him on 11 and 12 May as well as Bhutto's audience with Mao. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, playing host in Chou's stead, called attention to that fact in his 12 May banquet speech by noting that he had been "entrusted" by Chou to host the gathering. Teng also attended Bhutto's 11 May audience with Mao--the first time Teng has publicly joined the chairman in meeting foreign guests since he returned to public prominence two years ago.

SOUTH ASIA Chinese public statements during Bhutto's visit pointed up the present need for reconciliation in South Asia, while predictably praising Pakistan's struggle to sustain its sovereignty and independence. Teng Hsiao-ping's banquet speech on the 12th offered formal Chinese approval for the final implementation of the 1971 UN resolutions, stressing that these "new developments" have created "favorable conditions" for normalizing relations among the countries on the subcontinent. Focusing on Peking's own intentions, Teng went beyond the usual Chinese affirmation of friendship with the "peoples" of the region, asserting that Peking is now ready to develop relations with the "countries" of the subcontinent on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

In marked contrast to Chinese comment during Bhutto's 1972 visit, this time Chinese spokesmen studiously avoided direct criticism of India's policies in South Asia. They instead endeavored to portray China as having a common, anti-superpower interest with South Asian states, stressing that these states should be

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particularly vigilant against Soviet intentions. An 11 May PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial warned that the Soviets were "threatening the security" of the area. Teng's 12 May address, in referring to the 1971 war, placed full blame on the USSR for initiating the conflict that dismembered Pakistan while avoiding any mention of India's role. The joint communique issued by the two sides did contain indirect criticism of India as well as the Soviet Union, noting the need to maintain vigilance against "tendencies toward hegemonism and expansionism" in South Asia and also stating their opposition to "foreign" interference there.

As Chou En-lai had done during Bhutto's last visit, Teng on 12 May affirmed Chinese support for Kashmiri "self-determination"--a remark which triggered a walkout by the Indian representative at the banquet. Peking reiterated this stand in the joint communique. The Chinese had last affirmed such support in a 16 January 1974 banquet address by a PLA deputy chief of staff then visiting Pakistan.

PEKING CALLS FOR PARTY UNITY IN KIANGSI, KWEICHOW

Peking's concern to avoid entangling the struggle against Lin Piao and Confucius in a web of debilitating factional disputes has been demonstrated by instructions to two provinces--Kiangsi and Kweichow--that seem to call for halting all actions that would weaken unified party leadership or threaten production. Throughout the current ideological campaign Peking has repeatedly indicated that workers and peasants should participate in the struggle only during their sparetime hours, and that the campaign should serve to stimulate--not interrupt--production. The new warnings from the Central Committee, publicized by Nanchang radio on the 9th and Kweiyang radio on the 10th, signal a general tightening of Peking's crackdown against unauthorized factional excesses in some provinces. Neither Kiangsi nor Kweichow has a currently active party first secretary; both former leaders fell in the aftermath of the Lin affair and have never been replaced.

The Kweiyang broadcast reported that an "important note" from the central committee on criticism of Lin and Confucius in Kweichow was read at a 3 May rally held by the provincial party committee. The radio report did not give specific details of the note's content, but the rally participants seemed to be pointing a critical finger at certain provincial party officials when they denounced local

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attempts to "sow discord among the masses" and pledged to regard criticism of Lin and Confucius "in the leadership offices of the provincial CCP committee" as a "key point" of the campaign. Stressing the need for following the unified leadership of party committees in order to properly carry out the anti-Confucius campaign, the report declared that no individual can be allowed to go his "own way" and use central committee instructions "for his own purposes." Cadres were urged to see that the masses stay at their posts and grasp revolution and production so that criticism of Lin and Confucius can become a "powerful motive force impelling industrial and agricultural production."

The center's concern that the current ideological struggle be waged in a unified and controlled manner was also underscored in the Nanchang broadcast of a KIANGSI DAILY commentator's article. It revealed that Mao and the central committee have "issued important instructions" on many occasions in connection with the movement to criticize Lin and Confucius in "our province." The article focused on the need to eliminate all "words and deeds" at variance with central committee instructions, which must be obeyed "to the letter." It also called for strengthening unified party leadership to overcome the influence of Lin's followers, who have "stirred up trouble" by playing "one group against the other" in an attempt to split the party, and stated that no "breach of discipline" or "repetition" of these offenses would be allowed.

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U S S R

COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP RESURFACED; NEW PROMINENCE FOR MILITARY

Recent developments in the Soviet Union connected with the traditional May Day celebration in Red Square and the quadrennial USSR Supreme Soviet election campaign have provided striking evidence of new influences at work in Soviet politics. On the one hand the principle of oligarchical supremacy, which in recent years has been overshadowed by Brezhnev's burgeoning personality cult, was vigorously reaffirmed during the May Day ceremonies. In a separate but undoubtedly related development, the Soviet armed forces have for the first time in recent memory been officially acknowledged as a Soviet political constituency.

With little if any fanfare, the May Day ceremony this year was transformed from an event monopolized by Brezhnev into a practical reaffirmation of collective leadership. For the first time since 1965 no speech by a member of the leadership was delivered on Red Square--Brezhnev had performed the honors four times in the previous five years. This year's vacuum was filled by the publication in all central papers on 1 May of an unsigned message of greetings from the collective institutions of power--the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers.

In another significant departure with perhaps more far-reaching implications, the regime newly acknowledged the armed forces as a powerful constituency in the Soviet body politic. This acknowledgment came in the form of a significant change in the usually stereotyped "open letter" in which the Soviet leaders traditionally address the public during the quadrennial national election campaigns. This year's letter, published in PRAVDA on 5 May, for the first time in the post-Stalin period listed "military units" and "service-men of the army and navy" as constituents of the 28 members of the Soviet leadership, along with the customary "collectives of enterprises, collective farms, state farms, institutions and educational establishments."

This innovation in Soviet political symbolism appears to formalize another step in the gradual process of bureaucratic accommodation that has been a principal hallmark of the post-Khrushchev regime. The entry of Soviet Defense Minister Grechko into the CPSU Politburo in April 1973, together with Foreign Minister Gromyko and KGB Chairman Andropov, marked the culmination of this process, reviving for the first time in two decades direct representation in the Politburo of all the major bureaucracies in the Soviet state.

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NOTE

PRC-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS: Unusual Peking publicity surrounding the Manila visit by a Chinese basketball team has demonstrated China's interest in expediting the establishment of formal Sino-Philippine relations. NCNA reports on the PRC team's meetings with President Marcos and Foreign Minister Romulo went beyond the usual reportage and featured separate reports highlighting the Philippine leaders' stated desire to formalize diplomatic relations "soon." NCNA's brief report on Marcos' meeting with the Chinese team on 7 May was followed on the 8th by a dispatch quoting Marcos as saying the present situation was leading "inexorably" toward normalization of relations, which he hoped would occur soon. Similarly, NCNA's routine report on Romulo's meeting with the PRC team during his 11 May Hong Kong stopover also was followed up with a report on his press conference remarks advocating formal relations with the PRC. The only other recent instance of Peking quoting a Southeast Asian leader's desire for closer ties with China occurred on 26 April, when NCNA reported Malaysia Prime Minister Razak's remarks to the press four days earlier that Malaysia and the PRC would establish relations in the near future.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 6 - 12 MAY 1974

Moscow (2850 items)

VE Day Anniversary	(1%)	18%
Arab-Israeli Issue	(2%)	9%
[Gromyko in Syria,	(1%)	7%]
Cyprus Meeting With		
Kissinger		
China	(7%)	8%
Supreme Soviet Elections	(7%)	7%
Party-Government Reso-	(--)	4%
lution on Harvest		
USSR-GDR Friendship	(--)	4%
Society Meeting		
Soviet Press Day	(2%)	3%

Peking (991 items)

Senegal President Senghor	(--)	12%*
in PRC		
Indochina	(5%)	10%
[PRG Women's Delega-	(--)	5%]
tion in PRC		
[Cambodian Front	(3%)	4%]
Leaders in Romania,		
Africa		
UNGA Special Session	(9%)	7%
Pakistan Prime Minister	(--)	5%*
Bhutto in PRC		
Criticism of Lin Piao	(5%)	4%
and Confucius		
7 May Mao Statement	(--)	3%
Anniversary		
India	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* These figures exclude brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meetings with Senghor and Bhutto.